USE OF STANDARD MULTIPLE REGRESSION TO UNDERSTAND AND PREDICT DELIVERY OF SECURE LAND RIGHTS IN SELECTED WESTERN DISTRICTS OF UGANDA

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Abstract

According to Oxfam secure land rights and equitable land governance are vital in achieving poverty eradication, sustainable land use, reduced land conflict and social stability (Oxfam, 2018). The study used a quantitative sample of 394 obtained from a target population of 2116 respondents involved in land policy implementation. This study used standard multiple regression to determine the central-local governmental relations variables that have the strongest unique contribution in explaining current land policy implementation. This study also used standard multiple regression to determine the central-local governmental relations variables that have the strongest unique contribution in predicting land policy implementation in selected western districts of Uganda.

Key words: secure land rights, land policy implementation, standard multiple regression

Historical Background

Historically, land policy implementation has been a chronic subject of huge importance in the world. Land reform has been a recurring theme of enormous consequence in world history. The Semproninan Law proposed by Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus and passed by the Roman Senate (133 BC) led to the social and political wars in its peripheries that ended the Roman Republic (Klazinga, 2015). In the 19th century, most of the land in Ireland was owned by large English landowners. This led to The Great Irish Famine of 1845 to1852 and to the Land War of 1870s to1890s. This land was transferred to local Irish tenants with funding from United Kingdom this in turn led to improved relations between the centre and local land owners (O'Grada, 2004). In Mexico the Lerdo Law of 1856 enacted during the Reform War, resulted in church and municipal land seized and distributed to small owners. Later President Lazaro Cardenas of Mexico hoping to win the support of locals helped redistribute 45,000,000 acres of land (Montesinos, 2015). The Ottoman Land Code of 1858 under the Ottoman Empire aimed at generating more revenue for the state and for the state to have greater control over individual land. This however resulted in civil unrest (Gozel, 2007). In 1946 the Communist Party of China under Mao launched a thorough land reform which won the party millions of supporters among the poor and middle peasantry. This in turn became a foundation for local-centre relations in China. Millions of landlords lost their lives

in these reforms by mostly public execution to give way to transfer of land to peasants (Grad, 2001).

In Africa, the nationalization of agricultural land in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia led to the departure of majority of Europeans giving greater control of the periphery to central governments (Cagiano De Azevedo, 1994). In East, Central and Southern Africa, land policy implementation is prominent in most countries. There is need to correct historical injustices as in the case with Zimbabwe, Eritrea and South Africa; the need to rationalize distortion in land relations as in the case of Kenya, Malawi and Mozambique; and the desire to modernize indigenous tenure as a means of stimulating agrarian development as in Swaziland, Kenya and South Africa. (Peters, 2013). Where the locals have embraced these reforms as in Zimbabwe the land reforms have registered success (Osman, 2014; Scoones, Marongwe, Mavedzenge, Murimbarimba, Mahenehene & Sukume, 2011). Green notes that land tenure reform is certainly one of the most divisive yet important topics today. For countries with high rural populations and high population growth rates (like Uganda), an efficient and fair land tenure system is commonly seen as necessary in order to alleviate poverty and reduce conflict (Green, 2005). Examples of countries where National Land Policies have been adopted and implemented include, Tanzania (1992), Mozambique (1995), Ghana (1999), Zambia (2004) and Uganda (2013) (Odhiambo 2015).

In pre-colonial Uganda indigenous administration recognized both individual and communal rights to land. Individual rights to land included access and use rights and not ownership rights. During this period no indigenous community in Uganda accepted individual ownership of land (Mwesigye, Matsumoto & Otsuka, 2014). After 1900, the British colonialists added to customary tenure, *mailo* land, freehold and leasehold. *Mailo* land came out of the 1900 Buganda Agreement in which the land of Buganda was given to the Buganda king and his notables. In the same year, 1900, the Toro Agreement established rents in cash and kind to landlords. Similary, the 1901 Ankole Agreement, but it gave the Ankole king 800 square miles and the rest to his chiefs, strengthening the British central government and weakening the Ankole king's local government (Kafureka, 1992). In the then Ankole (including current, Sheema and Bushenyi) and Toro Kingdoms (including current Kasese) native freehold was negotiated in exchange for British protection under the British Protectorate (Bruce et al., 2010; Mwesigye, Matsumoto & Otsuka, 2014). The Crown Lands Ordinance of 1903 granted indigenous Ugandans the right to occupy land that had not been granted to anyone else, through freehold or leasehold, in accordance with their customary law. It is during the colonial period that central-local governmental relations with regard to land emerged in Uganda (Foley, 2007).

In 1919 the colonial government set up local administration, through the African (Native) Authority Ordinance (Villadsen & Lubanga, 1996). In 1928 the Busuulu and Envujjo law was enacted that regulated landlords and tenants in Buganda. This was followed by comparable laws in Ankole and Toro by 1938 (MoLHUD, 2013a). The Toro Landlord and Tenant Law of 1937 and the Ankole Landlord and Tenant Law of 1937 (MoLHUD, 2013b). In 1949 the Local Government Ordinance established the district as a local government unit with fairly autonomous administration (Ojambo, 2012). In 1952 Kazinga National Park was gazetted and later renamed Queen Elizabeth National Park officially displacing the Basongora (Matovu, 2012). In 1955 the publication of the East African Royal Commission

Report recommended reform of customary tenure in British colonies. Rejected in other districts, Ankole, Kigezi and later Bugisu embraced the conversion of customary to freehold tenure (Mugambwa, 2007). From 1955-1964 local administration was strengthened. Ironically during this time the post-independence Public Lands Act of 1962 confirmed the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1903 that curtailed the rights of customary tenants in case the state chose to sell or lease their land (Foley, 2007).

Then 1964-1985 featured recentralization and severe weakening of local administration. For instance in 1964 indigenous pastoral land was turned into state ranches in Ankole (MoLHUD, 2013a). However the Public Lands Act of 1969 gave customary tenants a voice in the sell or lease of land they occupied. The Act also gave them rights to apply for lease over the lands they occupied (Foley, 2007). This was followed in 1975 by the Land Reform Decree under Idi Amin Dada. That made the state trustee of all land in Uganda through the Uganda Land Commission. This decree abolished freehold and mailoland and converted them into leaseholds for either 99 or 999 years (Obaikol, 2014). This also affected customary tenants who lost their limited protections given to them by the Public Lands Act of 1969. The right of Ugandans to occupy public land through customary tenure without central governments express permission became a criminal offence punishable by one year imprisonment. Customary tenants retained their right to sell or give away their tenure, provided this did not vest any title in the transferee. Any transfer that claimed to give such title became a criminal offence punishable by two years imprisonment. The Uganda Land Commission could lease land occupied by customary tenants without their consent. In practice most of the provisions of the Land Reform Decree of 1975 remained unimplemented until the 1998 Land Act repealed it (Foley, 2007).

From 1987 to date significant devolution of power and services from the centre to the locals has pertained but with trends to recentralization (Okidi & Guloba, 2006). The radical title to land under the 1975 Decree by President Idi Amin Dada was abolished under the 1995 constitution which brought about fundamental reforms in ownership, tenure management and control of land in Uganda. Article 237 of the constitution provides that land in Uganda shall belong to the citizens of Uganda. This made Uganda the first State in Sub Saharan Africa to vest its radical title in its citizens (MoLHUD, 2013). As such, the 1995 Uganda Constitution espoused devolution which considerably shifted land policy implementation from the central government to the local government. The two most important issues covered by the Land Act are land rights and land administration (Foley, 2007) which this article zeroes on. Secure land rights and equitable land governance are vital in achieving poverty eradication, sustainable land use, reduced land conflict and social stability (Oxfam, 2018). Land rights are thus a pertinent issue in the world today. These land rights which include ownership; use and access rights are both formal and informal. This is due to the colonial legacy which gave rise to the phenomenon of multiple and conflicting rights on one and the same piece of land (registered land) which has bedeviled Uganda up to today (Economic Commission for Africa, 2012). Therefore to operationalize the Land Act, the UNLP was made in 2013 to ensure that the management of the land sector contributes to democratic governance. As a consequence it is

carrying out land reforms within the government policies of decentralisation and empowerment of the people (Bwogi, n.d).

Statement of the problem

Land policy implementation in Uganda continues to be problematic despite several policy interventions throughout its land governance history. There continues to be a legal dualism in the land system, a multiplicity of tenure regimes as well as multiple rights and interests overlapping in the same piece of land (MoLHUD, 2011). Land management institutions are generally weak and have not facilitated rapid progress to the goals laid out in legislation and policy (USAID, n.d). As a result land disputes and conflicts have become part of the definition of contemporary Uganda (MoLHUD, 2013a). Odhiambo (2015) argues that, there continues to be a gap between policy development and policy implementation. Successive post-independence governments failed to address underlying issues in land governance and efforts in land policy remained unimplemented (MoLHUD, 2015).

In 2013 Uganda promulgated the Uganda National Land Policy under a decentralisation framework. However, as already seen in the contextual background of this study, political, administrative and financial relations between the central and local governments do not fully support land policy implementation. This has led to land rights insecurity as a result of improper record keeping, inaccuracies in land registry process, fraud and forgeries in the land rights administration system (Obaikol, 2014). At this stage in the UNLP 2013 implementation process, it is yet unknown how strong it is to address the loopholes in land matters under current central-local governmental relations. Hence the need to investigate how relationship between the central and local governments affects the way land policy is implemented. Failure to address these loopholes will lead to continued land insecurity, land disputes and land conflict (Byamugisha, 2014b). The urgency of this study is mirrored by the decision of the President Yoweri Museveni Kaguta of Uganda in 2017 to set up a Commission of Land Inquiry, due to the continued land insecurity, land disputes and conflicts, to probe efficiency of the laws, policies, and processes of land registration, acquisition, administration and management.

Methodology

The study used quantitative methods. Using a sample of 394 obtained from a target population of 2116 land policy implementers, questionnaires were employed. Data from the questionnaire was analysed using quantitative techniques. The researcher utilized the software IBM Statistics SPSS v.23. The researcher used multiple regression which is based on correlations but allows a more sophisticated exploration of the interrelationship among a set of variables. This makes it ideal to test real life as opposed to laboratory based research questions (Pallant, 2011). Multiple regression tells you how well a set of variables is able to predict a particular outcome. That is how well a set of independent variables can predict a dependent variable. In the case of this research three independent variables that is; political relations, administrative relations and financial relations were investigated against delivery of secure land rights. Specifically standard multiple regression was used in this study. In standard multiple regression all the independent variables can be entered into the SPSS equation simultaneously. Unlike in partial correlation where the confounding variable is isolated, in regression the moderating variable is treated as an independent variable when

tested during computation since the Beta value used gives the contribution of each independent variable on the dependent variable (Pallant, 2011).

The researcher began with checking the assumptions to determine the specific regression technique to use. It is worth noting here that the researcher did not consider correlation since after running Pearson's Linear Correlation Coefficient (PLCC) the R value obtained (r = 0.186) showed a small/weak relationship between the independent and dependent variable. Cohen (1988 as cited in Pallant, 2011) writes that r = 0.1 – 0.2 is small and shows a weak relationship. The coefficient of determination was also calculated to discover the amount of variance the two variables shared. That is r squared times one hundred which was less than 4 percent. This meant that the two variables had little overlap (Pallant, 2011). Therefore central-local governmental relations explain only approximately 4% of the variance in respondent's scores on land policy implementation. Since the sample used was large (N= or > 100) then there was no need to examine adjusted r squared or standard error of the estimate. Thus even though the sample for this research was large the correlation was of no statistical significance since it is below r = 0.2 (Pallant, 2011).

Table 1: Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
	.186[a]	.035	.025	.66695

Source: Primary Data, 2017

Consequently this research looked at the contribution of each of the independent variables to the dependent variable to make inferences. This was done using regression as explained in the next sub-heading. The findings showed that two variables were statistically significant allowing for deductions and conclusions to be made from them.

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The SPSS equation of this study was: IV = (TCLP+TCLA+TCLF+TCMPLP)

Where,

IV = Independent Variable

TCLP = Total Central-Local Political Relations

TCLA = Total Central-Local Administrative Relations

TCLF = Total Central-Local Financial Relations

TCMPLP = Total Customary Practices and Institutions

Assumptions of Standard Multiple Regression (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007 as cited in Pallant, 2011):

a) *Sample size.* The sample must be large enough for generalizability. That is with small samples you may not obtain results that can be generalized to other samples. They have no scientific value since they cannot be repeated with other samples. A formula for sample size requirements to perform standard multiple regression is N > 50+8m (where m is the number of independent variables). This study met this requirement since 394 > 50+8 (4) =82.

b) *Multicollinearity and singularity.* Standard Multiple Regression does not like them both. Multicollinearity exists when the independent variables are highly correlated (r = 0.9 and above). The r value gives the total contribution of all independent variables on the dependent variable. In this study r was computed at 0.186. This meant there was no multicollinearity. Singularity on the other hand occurs when one independent variable is a combination of other independent variables. This studies independent variables did not have singularity. With regard to the moderating variable, only land rights delivery was treated ignoring land rights administration as shown below. Therefore singularity was avoided in this study.

c) *Outliers.* Multiple regression is sensitive to outliers, that is extreme scores. The study ensured during data cleaning that all score were in the scale used and any error causing outliers were cleaned out with the actual values.

   Tabachnick and Fidell (2007 as cited in Pallant, 2011) define outliers as cases that have a standardized residual of more than 3.3 or less than -3.3. From the scatter plot below (Figure 2) the standardized residuals all lie in this margin except one.

   Pallant (2011) also suggests that with large samples (n = or >100) it is not uncommon to find a number of outlying residuals. She says if you find only a few it may not be necessary to take action. The sample used for respondents was 394 which is greater than 100 thus the researcher did not take action because of the presence of only one outlying residual.

   Pallant (2011) further suggest that a scatter plot of standardized residuals should show residuals roughly rectangularly distributed with most of the scores concentrated in the centre (along the 0 point). This is perfectly demonstrated by the scatter plot below (Figure 2). This is good for standard multiple regression.

Figure 2: Scatter plot showing standardised residual and outlier: Source: Primary Data, 2017

d) *Homoscedasticity:* Pallant (2011) also suggests that the variance of residuals about predicted dependent variable scores should be the same for all predicted scores. This would appear linear and evenly shaped with no funneling (funnel shape of residuals). Funneling is not seen in the scatter plot (Figure 2) and therefore the data did not violate the assumption of homoscedasticity.

e) *Normality and linearity.* These refer to various aspects of the distribution of scores and the nature of the underlying relationship between variables. For normality the histogram generated using SPSS when computing multiple regression should reveal normal distribution of scores. Below is the histogram generated in this study using primary data showing normality.

Figure 3: Histogram Showing Normality: Source: Primary Data, 2017

Linearity on the other hand stresses that the relationship between the two variables

should be linear. This means when you see a P-P Plot generated by SPSS you should

see roughly a straight line not a curve. Below is a P-P Plot generated using primary

data revealing linearity.

Figure 4: P-P Plot Showing Linearity: Source: Primary Data, 2018

Therefore from the above discussion it was concluded that standard multiple regression was ideal for this study. The purpose of regression in this study was to find out the contribution of each independent variable to the dependent variable. This helped the researcher answer the research questions of the study namely:

1) How are the political relations between central and local governments in the delivery of secure land rights?
2) How are administrative relations between central and local governments in the delivery of secure land rights?
3) How are financial relations between central and local governments in the delivery of secure land rights?
4) What is the effect of customary practices and institutions in the delivery of land rights?

The Beta value under standardized coefficients was looked at because these values of each variable have been converted to the same scale allowing them to be compared (Pallant, 2011). Standardized Beta variables are ideal for theoretical research which aims at explaining a problem as opposed to the use of unstandardized variables that are ideal for applied research that aims at solving problems (Pallant, 2011). The largest Beta value (ignoring any negative signs) means that this variable makes the

strongest unique contribution to explaining the dependent variable. Table 2 below shows Beta values computed using SPSS.

Table 2: Regression Coefficients

	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta	
TCLP	.155	.075	.111	.038
TCLA	-.112	.072	-.082	.121
TCLF	-.111	.053	-.108	.037
TCMPLP	-.081	.081	-.055	.316

a. Dependent Variable: TLPI
Source: Primary Data, 2017

From the table above, the variables that made the strongest unique contribution to explaining the dependent variable, in descending order were:

1) Central-Local Political Relations with Beta value of 0.111
2) Central-Local Financial Relations with Beta value of 0.108
3) Central-Local Administrative Relations with Beta vale of 0.082
4) Customary Practices and Institutions with Beat value of 0.055

Furthermore if the sig. value of a variable is less than 0.05 then the variable is making a statistically significant contribution to the prediction of the dependent variable. A look at the sig. values revealed that the two variables making statistically significant unique contributions to the prediction of the dependent variable, in descending order were:

1) Central-Local Financial Relations with sig. value of 0.037
2) Central-Local Political Relations with sig. vale of 0.038

The sig. values revealed that Central-Local Administrative Relations did not make a statistically significant contribution to the prediction of the dependent variable. The sig. values showed that Customary Practices and Institutions did not make a statistically significant unique contribution to the prediction of the dependent variable.

Unlike descriptive statistics which describe the sample, inferential statistics can be used to make inferences/extrapolations on the population the sample represented. This helped determine the nexus/connection between central-local governmental relations and land policy implementation. Therefore using the findings above the following inferences can be made on the research questions:

1) How are the political relations between central and local governments in the delivery of secure land rights?

Political relations between central and local governments made the strongest unique contribution to explaining the delivery of secure land rights. This is in tandem with findings by Lambright (2011) which attributed local government performance to political relations between the central government and local governments in Uganda. Political relations include policy guidance, non-political interference and local participation. Hence in Uganda current land policy implementation in the delivery of secure land rights can be explained majorly by central-local political relations. This finding is reinforced by Lewis (2015) who says, 'elite capture' of local power structures has been facilitated by the desire of ruling elites to create and sustain power bases in the countryside. Popular perceptions of the logic of patronage politics, combined with weak accountability mechanisms, have reinforced this outcome.

Also political relations between central and local governments make a statistically significant unique contribution in predicting the delivery of secure land rights. Lewis (2015) noted that decentralisation advocates argue that decentralized governments are more responsive to the needs of the deprived than central governments and thus are more likely to conceive and implement policies for their benefit. Thus policy makers should rely on political relations between central and local governments in making predictions in the delivery of secure land rights.

Since the relationship between political relations and delivery of secure land rights is a positive one according to the positive r value +0.186 (Table 1) and the Scatter Plot (Figure 2) then an improvement in policy guidance (The Economic Commission for Africa, 2012), non-political interference (Lewis, 2015) and local participation in decision making (Stoker, 1989; Anderson, 1991) would lead to an improvement in delivery of secure land rights.

The policy makers should also note that a reduction/negation of the said constructs would reduce/negate delivery of land rights.

2) How are administrative relations between central and local governments in the delivery of secure land rights?

Administrative relations between central and local governments are third in making a strong unique contribution in explaining the delivery of secure land rights. This implies that central-local administrative relations are lesser in strength in explaining current delivery of secure land rights than political and financial relations.

Also administrative relations between central and local governments do not make a statistically unique contribution in predicting delivery of secure land rights. Therefore policy makers should not attempt to address administrative relations apart from other aspects of central-local governmental relations because this may not change delivery of secure land rights. Edward, (1980 as cited in Makinde, 2005) observes that where there is organisational fragmentation it may hinder coordination and the successful implementation of a complex policy especially one that requires the cooperation of many people. This seems to agree with the systems theory.

Also if policy makers want to predict delivery of secure land rights they should not rely singularly on administrative relations between central and local governments to achieve

this. One of the priority actions in the NLP-IAP is to build capacity at all levels of government (MoLHUD, 2015). Consultants contracted by the government of Uganda to study how to improve land policy implementation suggested restructuring. The restructuring would necessitate carrying out an assessment of the existing land governance structures both at the centre and in local government's levels, including Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development, Ministry Zonal Offices (MZOs), District Land Offices (DLOs), District Land Boards (DLBs), Area Land Committees (ALCs), Recorders, as well as selected non-state institutions working with the land sector aimed at identifying gaps and required actions for building the said capacity (DAI, 2016). This fits in well with the findings of this study above that suggest an across the board approach if administrative relations are to affect land policy implementation.

3) *How are financial relations between central and local governments in the delivery of secure land rights?*

Financial relations have been mentioned in the literature review of this study as the essence of central-local governmental relations (Agranoff, 2004). This is precisely reflected in the above study inferential statistics.

Financial relations made the next strongest unique contribution after political relations in explaining land rights delivery. This means that the current state of land policy implementation can be explained by firstly political relations and then financial relations between central and local governments. This also means that financial relations when addressed positively will affect positively, delivery of secure land rights.

In addition financial relations between central and local governments made the most statistically unique significant prediction in the delivery of secure land rights. As some have noted, inter-governmental relations between levels of government are hinged entirely on financial relations (Gildenhuys & Wissink, 1991).

Therefore policy makers can pay singular attention to financial relations between central and local governments and this alone would predict or influence delivery of secure land rights. Constricted fiscal relations between the levels of government in Uganda have been observed (Okidi & Guloba, 2006). The policy implication of this finding is that with government currently funding only one percent of the lands sector there is bound to be little or no change in land policy implementation. Makinde (2005) writes that without adequate funds, laws will not be enforced, services will not be provided and practical policy will not be developed. These findings should compel government to improve central-local financial relations which have a strong predictive capacity in determining the delivery of land rights.

4) *What is the effect of customary practices and institutions in the delivery of land rights?*

Customary practices and institutions make the least statistically unique contribution in explaining delivery of secure land rights. This means that customary practices and institutions contribution is inferior to central-local governmental relations variables. Anderson (1991) noted that community institutions can be employed in the administration of government programmes at the central and/or local levels and could affect policy implementation. Hence government should address customary practices and institutions after or alongside central-local relations since they all contribute in explaining delivery of secure land rights. Researchers found out that with regard to land rights, persons with titled and registered land

had a fuller set of rights than persons and households without titled. They also felt they were more protected in case of land disputes and evictions (Kisamba-Mugerwa, et al., 1989 as cited in Lastarria-Cornhiel, 2003). This means that registration and certification of customary land rights will improve land rights security in Uganda. Even the Economic Commission for Africa (2012) noted that, triggers of land conflicts include a vague understanding or definition in existing laws of customary rights of access to land.

Customary practices and institutions also do not make a statistically unique contribution in predicting delivery of secure land rights. Hence if policymakers want to predict delivery of secure land rights they should not rely on customary practices and institutions alone to achieve this. Instead these should be addressed together with central-local political and financial relations in order to be statistically sure of predicting the delivery of secure land rights. United States Agency for International Development seem to concur that there is a need to strengthen the capacity of Uganda's public institutions to manage and resolve conflict over land and natural resources and, at the same time, to enhance the capacities of Uganda's private citizens to understand, assert and defend their rights (USAID, n.d)

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